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RECENT CASES
ACTIONS--INABILITY TO DEERMINE A QUESTION OF FACT AS A BASIS FOR
JOINT LIABILITY-PEN sYIvANIA JOINT SUIT ACT OF I923-The plaintiff
joined the owner of an automobile with the bailee in an action to recover for per-
sonal injuries sustained due to the negligence of the chauffeur in the operation
of the car. Both defendants were undertakers. The bailee had hired the car
together with the driver from the owner for use in a funeral which the bailee
was conducting. At the close of the plaihtiff's case, each defendant was
granted a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish the rela-
tionship of master and servant as between the driver and either of the defend-
ants. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that the trial court should have allowed the
case to go to the jury to determine which one of the two defendants was the
controlling master and if unable so to find, then both defendants should be liable
under the Joint Suit Act Lang v. Hanlon, 153 Atl. 143 (Pa. 193o).
Since the enactment of the Joint Suit Act in 1923,2 the Superior and Su-
preme Courts of Pennsylvania have had occasion in a score or so of cases to
construe the statute. In all of these cases, the appellate courts have consistently
held that the scope of the Act was purely procedural -- its purpose being to
obviate the harsh rule of the common law which required the dismissal of a
plaintiff's case entirely when joint liability was averred and not proven. The
effect of the statute is to convert an allegation of joint liability into one of
several liability where the evidence does not justify a recovery as against all
of the defendants, thus releasing those defendants not found to be liable and
allowing the suit to proceed as against the others.' The Supreme Court, in the
principal case, departed from the theory of the previous interpretations of the
statute, holding that the Joint Suit Act, in effect, conferred a new substantive
right upon a plaintiff, who, though successful in establishing both negligence
and several liability as against one of two defendants was unable to definitely
'Act of June 29, 1923, P. L. 981.
'Ibd., the Act provides that ". . . whenever it is pleaded in any suit that
two or more defendants are jointly liable for the cause of action specified, and,
in the opinion of the trial judge, the evidence may not justify a recovery against
some of them, the suit shall not be dismissed as to all, but the case shall be sub-
mitted to the jury, if the facts are in dispute, to determine which, if any of
them, are liable, or, if the facts are not in dispute, the question of liability of
any or all of them may be reserved for consideration by the court en banc, or
the suit may be dismissed as to some and the trial proceed against the others,
in every such contingency, with the same effect as if the defendants ultimately
found to be liable were the only ones alleged to be so."
"Since the statute deals with procedure alone, and affects no substantive
rights, . . ." Cleary v. Quaker City Cab Co., 285 Pa. 24I, 246, 132 Ati. I85,
187 (1926). "This is no longer true, since the passage of the Joint Suit Act
(June 29, 1923, P. L. 98I), procedural legislation, which has found approval in
this court. . . ." Moraski et at. v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 293 Pa.
224, 230, 142 Atl. 276, 278 (I928).
'Bailey v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., et aL., 153 At. 422 (Pa. 1931).
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allocate the responsibility to one.' Perhaps the only precedent for this departure
from established legal concepts of joint and several liability is its extreme
practicality which is analogous to that of the ancient judgment of King Solo-
mon, in deciding the disputed question of the materity of an infant.' It must
be admitted the recent construction placed upon the Joint Suit Act produces a
just result because many an injured plaintiff has been left without a remedy
because of the difficulty of proving which one of two persons was in con-
trol of a given situation and a particular servant. The result reached may be
further supported by the practical consideration that the business of both de-
fendants was perhaps equally benefited and, therefore, both should be liable
regardless of the question of control. The control test of agency is more
theoretical than practical in this type of case. This interpretation given to the
Act may, by judicial decision, be applied to cases where additional defendants
have been joined by the original defendant under the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929.Y Al-
though the decided cases 8 have taken the view that the latter Act confers no
additional right on the plaintiff, the language of the Act warrants the contrary
construction.' Since a procedendo was awarded in the instant case, it will be in-
teresting to observe the .further progress of the action to determine whether the
court will adhere to this novel but surely practical interpretation of the Act.
AGENcy-KNOWLEDGE OF AGENT-TRANSACTIONS OccuaniNo AFTER TR-
MINATION OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP-Palfrey, defendant's agent, from informa-
tion obtained before and during his employment by defendant, knew that Mor-
rill, agent of the plaintiff, was exceeding his authority in making certain stock
purchases from defendant on plaintiff's account. Palfrey left defendant's em-
ploy, and Morrill continued to exceed his authority. Defendant never actually
knew about these facts. Plaintiff seeks to be discharged of liability for all
purchases made by Morrill in excess of his authority. Held, that plaintiff was
absolved from liability for such purchases. New England Trust Co. v. Bright,
174 N. E. 469 (Mass. I93i).
'Quoting from the opinion by Kephart, J., "If unable to so find, then both
defendants, will be liable, for here was undoubtedly a tortious act, and the Act
of 1923, P. L. 981 (12 P. S. §§ 685, 686), was enacted to meet just such a situa-
tion as this. Persons jointly causing an accident cannot escape liability by each
blanming it on the other."
' THE BimlE, I KINGS iii, 16-28.
Act of April IO, 1929, P. L. 479.
" Vinnacombe et ux. v. Philadelphia et aL, 297 Pa. 564, 147 Atl. 826 (1929);
First National Bank of Pittsburgh v- Baird, 300 Pa. 92, i5o At. 165 (193o).
'The Act supra note 7, provides "That any defendant, named in any action,
may sue out, as of course, a writ of scire facias to bring upon the record as an
additional defendant any other person alleged to be liable over to him for the
cause of action declared on, or jointly or severally liable therefor with him,
with the same force and effect as if such other had been originally sued, and
such suit shall continue, both before and after judgment according to equitable
principles, although at common law, or under existing statutes, the plaintiff
could not properly have joined all such parties as defendants." See, Scott,
Some Aspects of the Pennsylvania Sci. Fa. Act for the Addition of Defendants
not Originally Sued (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306.
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Broadly stated, notice to, and knowledge of, the agent, while acting within
the scope of his authority, is notice to, and knowledge of, the principal The
courts, in their desire to hold the principal liable for the knowledge of the agent,
indulge in presumptions and fictions to explain their result. Some courts adopt
the "identity" theory, that the agent is the other self of the principal,$ while
other courts say that it is the duty of the agent to inform the principal of rel-
evant facts that he acquired during the course of his employment, and therefore
it is conclusively presumed that he discharged his duty.' One authority sug-
gests that the true rationale of the rule of constructive notice "must find its
ultimate foundation and only support in motives of policy and expediency . . .
otherwise the business affairs of society could not be safely transacted".' There
are two problems in the principal case: (i) Shall the knowledge of the agent,
acquired prior to his employment by the principal, be imputed to the principal?
(2) Shall such knowledge, and knowledge acquired during the existence of the
agency relationship, be imputed to the principal, so as to hold the principal
liable on transactions occurring after the agent has left his employ? The au-
thorities are in conflict on the first problem.5 The result depends upon what
theory of imputation the courts adopt.' As to the second problem there does
not appear to be any direct authority. There have been a few cases involving
analogous situations,7 but none of them are necessarily determinative of the case
12 MECHEM, AGENcY (2d ed. 1914) § 1803.
'Hall Machinery Co. v. Haley Furniture Co., 174 Ala. 19o, 56 So. 726
(191i) ; Boursot v. Savage, L. R. 2 Eq. 134 (1866). In this latter case, Kin-
dersley, V. C., says: "I confess my own impression is, that the principle on
which the doctrine rests is this: that my solicitor is alter ego; he is myself; I
stand in precisely the same position as he does in the transaction, and therefore
his knowledge is my knowledge; and it would be a monstrous injustice that I
should have the advantage of what he knows without the disadvantage," at 142.
'Distilled Spirits Cases, 78 U. S. 356 (187o) ; McKenney v. Ellsworth, 165
Cal. 326. T.2 Pac. 75 (1913); People's National Bank v. Morris, 152 Va. 814,
148 S. E. 828 (029).
'2 PomERioy, EQurrY JuRIsPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 676.
The following cases impute notice or knowledge: Humphrey v. Wyandt
Mtge. & Investment Co., 98 Kan. 266, 158 Pac. 42 (1916) ; Department of Trade
and Commerce of Nebraska v. Banker's Ins. Co., 117 Neb. 388, 22o N. W. 83o
(1928) ; Thimsen v. Reigard, 95 Ore. 45, 186 Pac. 559 192o). Contra: Hall
Machinery Co. v. Haley Furniture Co., supra note 2; Miller v. Jones, 32 Ky. L.
Rep. lO78, lO7 S. W. 783 (19o8) ; Kyle v. Gaff, 1o5 Mo. App. 672, 78 S. W.
1047 (1904).
'Under the identity theory, knowledge of the agent, acquired before the
agency, is not binding on the principal, for when the agent acquired his knowl-
edge, he was not the principal's alter ego. Under the presumption theory, if
the agent ever knew, and it was such a matter that he should have told the prin-
cipal, and it was something present in his mind during the agency, the courts
hold the principal liable. See cases sipra note 5.
See, for example, Irvine v. Grady, 85 Tex. 120, 19 S. W. 1028 (1892),
where P employed A to buy cattle, and later A abandoned the negotiation, hav-
ing acquired knowledge of certain facts. P effected the purchase through an-
other agent, and it was held that P was not charged with the knowledge that A
acquired. The court said that there was no duty upon A to communicate to P,
since his employment had terminated unsuccessfully. In this case, A was em-
ployed for a special purpose, whereas in the principal case, the agency was gen-
eral. See also Murray v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., igg Iowa II95, 2oi N. W.
976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
at hand because they dealt with knowledge of a special agent.8 This court, in
coming to its conclusion, is undoubtedly extending the doctrine of imputed
knowledge, and the wisdom of so doing is doubtful. The court says' that
constructive knowledge is actual knowledge. The court strictly adhered to its
formula for imputing notice; the agent knew, therefore the principal knew;
therefore, the principal still knows; therefore, the principal is liable. Although
it is proper to say that constructive knowledge should be treated as if it were
actual knowledge during the existence of the agency, the practical reason for
charging the principal therewith is gone when the agency has terminated. The
principal is no longer receiving the benefits of the agency relation-the trans-
action involved, while continuous in nature, are separate and distinct from each
other--and when this factor is added to the underlying policy of the courts not
to extend the doctrine of imputed notice," the result reached in the instant case
is at least questionable.
BILLS AND NoTEs-SuRETYsrnP-RIGHT OF AccomMODATION MAKER TO
SUBROGATION UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw-Accommodated
company transferred its note to the bank on which the plaintiffs were accom-
modation makers, and secured it by giving the bank a first mortgage. The
company having become insolvent, a receiver was appointed who sold receiver
certificates to bank to secure funds to run the business. These certificates
were liens subject to the first mortgage. Plaintiffs paid the note and claim
a right to a lien under the mortgage. Held, that plaintiffs were subrogated
to the rights of the bank under the first mortgage and thus have a lien prior to
that of the bank. Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 153 At. 205 (Vt.
1931).
The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that all situations not covered
by it shall be governed by the law merchant.' The statute is silent as to the
595 (1925), where it was held that the knowledge of a former agent of an in-
surance company was not to be imputed to the principal, so as to charge the
principal with that knowledge in a subsequent transaction, with which the
former agent had nothing to do.
'The court in the principal case distinguished an English case, Blackburn,
Low & Co. v. Vigors, 12 App. Cas. 531 (1887), which was urged upon the court
as presuasive authority. In that case, P effected a re-insurance on a ship
through A, who, during the course of his employ, acquired knowledge of certain
facts. Later, P obtained another policy on the ship, through another agent, and
the court held that the knowledge acquired by A was not to be imputed to P,
so as to charge P with knowledge in the subsequent transaction. The Massa-
chusetts court distinguished this case on the ground that there was an extended
course of dealings in the principal case, whereas there was only one transaction
in the English case. It is submitted that this is a distinction without a differ-
ence; that the real answer to the problem is dependent upon the nature of, and
reason for, imputed knowledge.
Principal case, at 471.
10 See 2 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 672, 676; Seavey, Notice Through
an Agent (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REV. i; NorE (1928) I So. CAL L. REv.
176, i8o.
NEGOTA]BLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 196.
RECENT CASES
rights and liabilities of accommodation makers with the exception of the one
section that creates a primary liability toward holders for value2 Consequently
in dealing with the legal relations of accommodation maker and the accommo-
dated party, the law merchant must govern. This body of law has consistently
defined that relation as one of principal and surety, the accommodation maker
being the surety.8 In the event of payment by the accommodation party, there-
fore, his remedies against the accommodated party should be governed solely
by surety law. One means of securing to the surety recompense for his pay-
ment is by subrogating him to any collateral security the creditor holds.' This
right of subrogation is not dependent on any relation between the accommoda-
tion maker to the holder of the note, but rises entirely from the fact that one
person is paying a debt which someone else should ultimately be called on to
pay.' Therefore the primary liability of the accommodation maker to the holder
of the note does not affect the rights of the accommodation maker against the
accommodated party. The instant case by allowing the right of subrogation to
the accommodation maker has followed the lead of other jurisdictions, which
reached the same equitable decision, in spite of a few strongly expressed dicta
to the contrary: The creditor wants to be paid. On being satisfied, he loses all
interest in the collateral securing the debt.' Since, as between the accommoda-
tion maker and the accommodated party, there is a superior obligation on the
part of the accommodated party to pay the debt,' it is only just that the accom-
modation maker get the maximum protection, when he pays the debt?'
2 NxmAmLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 29.
'Wendhorst v. Bergendahl, 21 S. D. 218, 11I N. W. 544 (i9o7). This case
was decided before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law by that
state. That the Negotiable Instruments Law did not destroy the principal-
surety relationship was decided in O'Neal v. Stuart, 281 Fed. 715 (C. C. A. 6th,
1922) ; Wakonda State Bank v. Fairfield, 53 S. D. 268, 220 N. W. 515 (1928).
'Bartell v. Zimmerman, 293 Ill. 154, 127 N. E. 373 (1920); Branch Bank-
ing Co. v. Boykin, 192 N. C. 262, 134 S. E. 643 (1926).
'McCormick's Adm'rs v. Irwin, 35 Pa. ini (186o) holds that "To )he cred-
itor, both may have been equally liable, but if, as between themselves, there is a
superior obligation resting on one to pay the debt, the other after paying it may
use the creditor's security to obtain reimbursement." See BRANIy, SuRErYsHip
AND GUARANTY (3d ed. i9o5) § 324.
'Furhman v. Furhman, 115 Md. 436, 8o At. io82 (1911) ; Gregg v. Texas
Bank, 235 S. W. 689 (Tex. 1921).
'lMerchant's Bank v. Bushnell, r42 Tenn. 275, 218 S. W. 709 (I92o) ; Spire
v. Spire, io4 Kan. 5oi, I8o Pac. 209 (igig). Though the expressions of opin-
ion in these cases seem to be on point, they can only be considered as dicta, as
the facts show that at the time of payment by the accommodation maker, the
collateral in guestion secured other indebtedness of the accommodated party, as
well as the debt paid. BRANNAN, NEGOTiABrE INSTRUMENTS LAW ( 4th ed.
1926) § 192, 925.
'Berthold Adm'x v. Berthold, 46 Mo. 557 (187o); Brandt, op. cit. supra
note 5 § 320.
' Bartell v. Zimmerman, op. cit. supra note 4.
10 Where, however, the third person does not have notice that the co-maker
is an accommodation party, it seems the co-maker should be estopped from set-
ting up a right to subrogation since he has lead the third party to believe that
payment on the note will extinguish the encumbrance absolutely.
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CONFLICT OF LAws-AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AS SUBMISSION TO JURIS-
DICTION-A contract contained a clause that all differences arising thereunder
should be "arbitrated at London pursuant to the Arbitration Law of Great
Britain".' Differences arose and plaintiff served notice on defendant in New
York to join in the arbitration proceedings in London. Defendant disregarded
the notice and the arbitration proceeded in accordance with the English Act.!
Plaintiff seeks judgment for the amount of the award. Held, reversing the
Special Term and the Appellate Division,' that there was a submission to the
English jurisdiction. Gilbert v. Burstine, 174 N. E. 7o6 (N. Y. i93I).
The commercial interest in this question is indicated by the appearance of
counsel for the Chamber of Commerce of State of New York, London Cham-
ber of Commerce, and London Court of Arbitration, as amic! curiae. The in-
stant case in the lower court is the basis of a discussion of the general problem
in a note in an earlier issue of the RmEw,' and the conclusion there reached
is supported by this decision.
CON"RACrS-IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE DUE To FLooD--Plaintiff con-
tracted with defendant drug store owner for a business expansion campaign re-
quiring acts to be done upon the premises. During the period of performance,
the store was so flooded that the business could not be carried on. Plaintiff
continued to tender performance. Defendant pleads that impossibility has ex-
cused both parties from performance arid, therefore, he is not liable on the con-
tract. Held, that defendant is liable, since the impossibility was merely the in-
ability on his part to receive performance and not impossibility in the nature of
the thing to be done. Retail Merchant's Business Expansion Co. v. Randall, 153
Atl. 357 (Vt. 1931).
Since the leading case of Paradhni v. Jane,' there has been a steady growth
in the law concerning impossibility of contract obligations with a striking
tendency toward liberality. Before the outbreak of the World War in 1914!
however, the extensions had been confined to a few specific situations; i. e. (I)
'52 & 53 ViCr. c. 49 (1889).
2 English Act permits Arbitration to proceed with court appointed arbi-
trator, supra note I, § 5.
3229 N. Y. App. Div. 170, 241 N. Y. Supp. 54 (1930) (refused to enforce
the award on the ground that it was based neither upon service within the juris-
diction nor voluntary appearance in the arbitration).
'Note (1931) U. OF PA. L. REv. 474.
' Aleyn 26 (1647) (a case not truly one of impossibility). "Where the law
creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform it without any
default in him, and hath no remedy over, there the law will excuse him. . . .
But where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself,
he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevi-
table necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract"'
2 See McNair, War-Time Impossibility of Performance of Contract (1919)
35 L. Q. REv. 84; Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of
Performance (ig2o) 18 MICH. L. REv. 589.
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impossibility in personal relations contracts, due to death' or physical incapacity
of the promisor, (2) impossibility arising from a change in law, and (3) im-
possibility created by the destruction of the thing, the existence of which was
necessary to the performance of the contract.' The third situation was further
extended by the famous Coronation Cases, led by Krell v. Henry,7 to the effect
that "the cessation or non-existence of an express condition or state of things
going to the root of the contract and essential to its performance will constitute
an excuse for non-performance."' But until the outbreak of the War, with
these exceptions, the statement made by the court in the principal case that it is
not the province of the courts to make or modify contracts, but merely to con-
strue them, was strictly adhered to.? The War cases, however, in order to re-
lieve situations where hardship would be worked by performance according to
the strict letter of contracts, gave rise to a judicial tendency to construe the con-
tractual intention with an eye directed to the time of performance, rather than
strictly as of the date of the contract." It is natural that the effect of the im-
possibility should have sprung into prominence as an additional consideration
with the cause thereof. Thus, there arose the rule that (i) the cause of the
supervening impossibility must be one that the parties, had they contemplated it,
would have regarded it as so obviously sufficient to terminate the obligation as
'Williams v. Butler, 58 Ind. App. 47, 1o5 N. E. 387 (1914); Blakely v.
Sousa, i97 Pa. 305, 47 Atl. 286 (Igoo).
"Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40, 36 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1877) ; Robinson v.
Davison, L. R. 6 Exch. 269 (1871); see Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463
(1857); Walsh v. Fisher, io2 Wis. 172, 78 N. W. 437 0x899) (danger from
strikers).
.Public Service Electric Co. v. Public Utility Comm'rs, 87 N. J. L. 128, 93
Atl. 707 (1915) (lighting preference rendered unlawful by later statute);
Bailey v. Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 178 (i869) (eminent domain proceedings
prevented) ; see (i93) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 645 (covenant to rebuild pre-
vented by building code).
But if performance is rendered more difficult or expensive merely, and not
unlawful, the change in law is no defense, Cowan v. Meyer, 125 Md. 450, 94
AtI. i8 (x915) ; Valley Co. v. McDonald Brick Co., io9 Ky. 408, 59 S. W. 332
(I9oo).
'Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477 (1832); Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 86
(1863).
7 [1903] 2 K. B. 740.
'Nickoll v. Ashton, [1go1 2 K. B. 126; see International Yacht Cases:
Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 17o App. Div. 484, 156
N. Y. Supp. 179 (1915); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Smith Serrell Co., go
Misc. 370, 153 N. Y. Supp. 264 (I915).
'But it is pointed out that this statement does not mean that the parties are
always liable according to the contract's terms, but rather that legal principles
alone will be applied, 3 WrLLSTON, CoNmAcrs (1922) § 1931.
" See MacNair, op. cit. supra note 2; Page, op cit. supra note 2. It is to
be noted that the similar situation created by the Spanish American War was
held insufficient to create such an extension, Ashman v. Cox, [1899] I Q. B.
439. This distinction seems to indicate that the real ratio decidendi of the
World War cases is not the unexpectedness of the situation but rather the fact
that it was a national calamity which affedted everyone.
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not to require expression," and (2) its effect must be to prevent performance of
all or almost all of the party's obligation, and not merely to create a necessity
for performance under conditions somewhat different from those contemplated.?
While the cause of the impossibility in the instant case was obviously one that
the parties might have contemplated as sufficient to terminate the obligation, the
court points out that its effect was to make the performance impossible merely
from a financial standpoint since the defendant, if he had possessed ample funds,
could have opened another store." It would seem that the policy to prevent
hardship that motivated the decisions in the War cases would at once be ap-
plicable in the case of a flood, but it is equally desirable that obligations of con-
tract be guarded from a too inclusive enlargement of the defense of impossibil-
ity." On this latter policy, the court's limitation of the principle of excusable
impossibility to situations where the impossibility consists in the nature of the
act to be done, rather than in the inability of the party to do it, would seem to
have produced a legally sound rule, although at the price of a hard case."
CORPORATIONs-FoREIGN CORPORATIONS--"WITHIN THE STATE" FOR PUR-
POSES or NOTICE TO CREDITORS TO FILE CLAIMs AGAINST DECEDENTS' ESTATES-
Plaintiff, a New York surety company, authorized to do, and doing, an insur-
ance business in South Dakota, appointed, as required by statute, the commis-
sioner of insurance as its agent to accept process in all proceedings against the
company. Plaintiff held a claim against one Haskins, who died on November
2, x923. Notice to creditors to file claims against decedent's estate was pub-
lished on January 2, 1924. The six-month statute of limitations for the filing
of such claims was applicable, by statute, to persons outside the state with
actual notice, and to all persons within the state irrespective of notice. Plain-
tiff first learned of Haskin's death on February i9, 1925, and presented its
claim to decedent's administrator on March x8, 1925. Payment was refused
on the ground that the statute had run on July 3, 1924. Plaintiff thereupon
sued 'for payment, contending that the statute was inapplicable, since it was
a foreign corporation and therefore "without" the state. Held, that notice to
creditors is process, that plaintiff is "within" the state for purposes of such
notice in the person of the insurance commissioner, and therefore subject to the
statute. American Surety Co. v. Haskins, 231 N. W. 942 (S. D. 1930).
For discussion of the principles involved see Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA.
L. REV. ante 956.
n For full discussion of cases, see McNair, op. cit. supra note 2, at 99; cf.
Woodward, Impossibility of Perfornance, as an Excuse for Breach of Contract
(1901) I COL. L. REV. 529, 533.
'McNair, op. cit. supra note 2, at 99.
"Slack, J., at 357. Accord: L. & L. Indemnity Co. v. Columbiana County,
1O7 Ohio St. 51, 14o N. E. 672 (1923).
"' As stated in principal case at 358.
"Accord: Montpelier v. National Surety Co., 97 Vt. 111, I2 Atl. 484
(1923) ; Hall v. Wisconsin Life Ins. Co., i85 Wis. 5o7, 2oi N. W. 732 (1925)
see PAGE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcrs (Supp. to 2d ed. i929) § 2676.
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EQUITY-JURISDICTION-PRoPERTY-REOVAL OF CLOUD ON TITLE GAINED
THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION BY COMPELLING A RELEASE OF RECORD TITE-
Complainant, holder of title gained by adverse possession for the statutory
period of the land in question, sought to compel the former owner to release the
record title which complainant's title superseded. Held, that the cloud would not
be removed. Day v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 153 Atl. 32 (R. I.
1931).
Title gained by a possession adverse to the former owner must remain un-
der a cloud, created by the record title of the original owner, unless equity will
take jurisdiction to compel a release of the documentary title to the holder of
the title acquired through adverse possession.1 The majority of courts grant re-
lief to the adverse possessor, or one claiming through him, in this situation by
recognizing his action and exercising jurisdiction to remove this cloud.' Some
courts, however, deny this jurisdiction and say that title coming by adverse
possession under the statute of limitations is only a "shield" and not a weapon
of offense, and that the remedy at law is therefore adequate1 While not deny-
ing jurisdiction in this situation, the court, in the principal case, refused to exer-
cise jurisdiction since the title was gained by "bare" adverse possession which
was unattended by any additional equity.' Because of this additional require-
ment, it would seem that Rhode Island is peculiar in its demands, although the
result is in accord with the minority view. However, both the view of the
minority of courts and of the court in the instant case, seem to be based on the
problem as concerning only the former owner and the holder of the title ad-
versely gained. In this, the cases supporting these views arrive at what seems
an unsatisfactory result because there is a matter of public policy involved which
they do not consider. The problem of the instant case is raised by the appli-
cation of two statutes, one, the statute o.f limitations, and the other, the recording
statute. Each has a definite public policy for its purpose, the former in quieting
title,' the latter in keeping an accurate record for the information of those
dealing with real estate5 Therefore, in order to serve the purposes of these
statutes, it would seem that courts of equity might well take jurisdiction to
compel the former owner to release his record title to the holder of title by
adverse possession.
16 PomRaoY, Equry JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. i9o5) §§ 685, 724.
Pendleton v. Alexander, 12 U. S. 462 (814) ; Clemmons v. Cox, r16 Ala.
567, 23 So. 79 (1897) ; Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 365 (1868) ; McKey v.
Barton, i94 Ill. 446, 62 N. E. 8o2 (Igo2).
3 Contee v. Lyons, ig D. C. 207 (i89o) ; McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17
Atl. 387 (i889) ; Miller v. Robertson, 35 Can. Sup. Ct. 80 (z904).
'See principal case, at 313.
'The underlying basis for the minority view might possibly be due to the
fact that these courts feel that one who avails himself of the Statute of Limita-
tions does not have clean hands and hence equity should. not aid him.
'See Arrington v. Liscom, supra note 2, at 386; (r9o4) 18 HAgv. L. REv.
147.
The purpose of these recording statutes would be defeated if the record
title does not conform to the actual title.
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INSURANCE-AUTO.dOBILE INSURANCE-LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY CON-
TRAcTs-Plaintiff recovered a judgment for personal injuries and issued an at-
tachment execution summoning the insurance company as garnishee. The
company denied liability under the policy because the insured had not actually
paid the judgment found against him. The policy contained the usual "no
action" clause, but the company had conducted the defence for the insured.
Held, that the insurance company was liable. West v. MacMillan (and Auto-
mobile Underwriters Insurance Co., Garnishees), 301 Pa. 344, 152 Atl. 1o4
(1930).
Policies covering personal injuries to third persons may be either liability
or indemnity contracts. In the former case little difficulty is found in allowing
the injured person to recover from the insurance company since the policy
directly provides for payment whenever the insured becomes liable for the loss
or damage against which the insurance covenant runs.' Where the policy spe-
cifically provides through the "no action" 2 clause that there shall be no liability
until the insured shall actually have paid a judgment against him, the great
weight of judicial opinion holds the policy to be an indemnity contract and no
right of action vests in the injured person nor in the insured until there has
been actual payment by the insured.3 Since no debt is due to the insured, under
the policy, until he pays, principles of subrogation cannot avail, and insolvency
acts as a complete bar to any liability on the part of the company.' These
rules, though considered good law have been so completely criticised as bad
justice that statutes in many states now change the result.5 The instant case is
an interesting example of an attempt to eliminate the harshness of the majority
views without the aid of statute. Relying on an earlier case,' the court held
that though the "no action" clause was present, the insurance company waived
or estopped itsetf from setting up the indemnity features of the contract when
' "It may be well to state here that the difference between the two classes of
contracts is that upon the former (indemnity contracts) an action cannot be
brought and a recovery had until the liability is discharged while upon the lat-
ter (liability contracts) the cause of action is complete when the liability at-
taches." Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppard, 53 Okl. 515, 522, 157 Pac. lO6 (1915) ;
Harrison v. Transit Co., 192 N. C. 545, 135 S. E. 460 (1926); Fritchie v.
Miller's Extract Co., 197 Pa. 401, 47 At. 351 (igol); Rose & Son, Inc., v.
Zurich Gen. Accident Co., 296 Pa. 206, 145 AtI. 813 (1929).
"No action shall lie against the (company) . . . to recover for any
loss . . . unless brought by the subscriber (the insured) himself, to recover
for moneys actually paid by him in legal tender of the United States to the
satisfaction of a final judgment after trial of the issue.
'Hebojoff v. Globe Indemnity Co., 35 Cal. App. 390, 16q Pac. 1048 (1918);
Pfeiler v. Penn Allen P. C. Co., 240 Pa. 468, 87 At. 623 (1913); Allen v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 88I (C. C. A. 3d, i9o6).
'Hollings v. Brown, 2o2 Ala. 504, 80 So. 792 (1919); Cushman v. Car-
bondale Fuel Co., 122 Iowa 656, 98 N. W. 509 (19o4) ; Burke v. London Guar-
antee & Ace. Co., 47 Misc. 171, 93 N. Y. S. 652 (1905). "The remedy for this
injustice, and we agree that it is gross injustice, must come if at all from the
legislature"-Cox, C. -., in Staggs v. Gotham Min. & Mill. Co., 208 Mo. App.
596, 6oo, 235 S. W. 511, 512.
'For complete collection of state statutes in Alabama, Conn., Mass., Ohio,
R. I., Wis., see VANCE, INSURANCE (1930) 686.
'Malley v. American Ind. Co., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Ati. 57I (1929).
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it took over the complete defense of the insured.7 While this holding is against
the great weight of authority 8 it is in complete accord with a well-established
minority view.0 By remaining aloof from the insured's defense of his own
case the company, of course, can still defend on the indemnity features of its
contracts; but even here the interesting dictum that final judgment against an
individual is an actual as well as a potential loss within the meaning of the in-
demnity policy" points the way to possible decisions against the insurance com-
pany in the future.
MORTGAGES-EFFECT OF PAYMENT BY MORTGAGOR TO FRsT MORTGAGEE IN
CONTEFPLATION OF AN ASSIGNMENT-A first mortgagee agreed that upon re-
ceipt of principal and interest on his mortgage he would assign it to a pur-
chaser to be obtained by the owner. The owner paid at the time of the
agreement $2ooo which was "to be credited to the amount to be received" by
the first mortgagee from the contemplated assignment. The second mortgagee,
being shown the receipt for the $2ooo, relied on it as a payment on the first
mortgage and refrained from foreclosing his claim. The first mortgage was
then assigned to the defendant, after which the first mortgagee refunded $2000
to the owner. The second mortgagee brought a bill to have the first mortgage
reduced. Held, that the first mortgage should not be reduced. Fair and Square
Bldg. & L. As-s'. v. Presbyterian Board, etc., 153 At. 341 (Pa. i93i).
An assignee of a mortgage takes free from latent equities in third persons
of which he had no notice;' the reason is, that "The assignee can always go
to the debtor, and ascertain what claims he may have against the bond, or
other chose in action, which he is about purchasing from the obligee; but he
may not be able, with the utmost diligence, to ascertain the latent equity of
some third person against the obligee".' But a mortgage cannot be kept alive
7 "Having safeguarded its (insurance company's) own interests by ascer-
taining through legal channels that a fair loss has been sustained, by its con-
duct of the trial it is estopped from denying its own liability and cannot prevent
the indemnitee from recovering, though the indemnitee's liability has not been
discharged by payment." Justice Kephart in instant case at 348.
'Traloar v. Keil & Hannon, 36 Cal. App. 159, 171 Pac. 823 (1918). See
cases cited in Note (I125) 37 A. L. R_ 637 citing following jurisdictions: Fed.,
Ala., Conn., Ill., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Mass., N. J., Tenn., Va., Wash., Wis.
'Elliott v. Belt Auto. Ass'n, 87 Fla. 545, ioo So. 797 (924) ; Patterson v.
Adan, i19 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281 (1912) ; Elliott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., ioo
Neb. 833, 161 N. W. 579 (1917); American Indemnity Co. v. Tellbourn, 114
Tex. 127, 263 S. W. 9o8 (924) ; see (I925) 3 TEx. L. R. 192.
" "It was shown in the Malley Case, supra (note 6), how a final judgment
against an individual was an actual as well as a potential loss within the mean-
ing of that term in the policy." Kephart, J., in instant case, at 348.
'Bigley v. Jones, 114 Pa. 510, 7 Atl. 54 (1886) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th
ed. 1928) io6g: RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. x928)
174.
Kent, C. J. in Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441, 443 (N. Y. 1817).
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as security for future advances as against a subsequent mortgagee or a judg-
ment creditor after the mortgage is actually paid.! The present case deals with
the question of whether an advance of money from the mortgagor to the first
mortgagee, which money is to be applied to an expectant assignment of the
first mortgage, constitutes a payment on the first mortgage when the rights
of a second mortgagee and as assignee of the first mortgage without notice
are involved. Strong arguments can be made in favor of both litigants. For
the second mortgagee it may be said the advance was either payment on the
first mortgage or was in contemplation of an assignment to the owner himself
or a "straw mar" in which case the legal and equitable estates of the owner
would merge, the effect of which would be a reduction of the first mortgage.'
It may be argued further in his favor that the assignee, being practically in the
place of the first mortgagee, is estopped from denying that payment was made
on the mortgage because of the representation by the first mortgagee through
the receipt given to the owner. In the event of either of those arguments being
sustained, the assignee would have a remedy in a right of action against the
first mortgagee under the contract of assignment. For the assignee it may be
argued that the contract between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee should
be given the effect expressed by thL parties since it is the policy of courts to
favor mortgage loans and hence an innocent purchaser should be protected.
The second mortgagee still has all he bargained for in the first place, and could
have protected himself by seeing to it that the transaction was recorded.
6 The
problem of solving this contest indirectly resolves itself into a balancing of
the equities between the parties, the one relying on public records and the other
on the rule of merger. It is submitted that the decision in the principal case
is correct, the fact that the second mortgagee could have protected himself
being a deciding factor in the balance. This suggests at once a hypothetical
case where the second mortgagee would not know of the transaction between
the owner and the first mortgagee. What the Court would do with that case
is a matter of pure conjecture although language in the opinion indicates that
the contract would be upheld. Another troublesome case would be where the
assignee would have notice of the payment made as an advance to the first
mortgagee or where the second mortgagee would bring a bill to reduce the first
mortgage before the assignment. The payment should then be considered as
a reduction of the first mortgage because in substance it amounts to keeping
I Lanphier v. Desmond, 187 Ill. 370, 58 N. E. W (igoo) ; Bogert v. Bliss,
148 N. Y. i94, 4- N. E. 582 ('896) ; Large v. Van Doren, 14 N. J. Eq. 28
(1862) ; Mitchell v. Coombs, 96 Pa. 430 (i88o) ; Loverin, Hall & Co. v. Hum-
boldt Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 113 Pa. 6, 4 Atl. 191 (1886) ; Girard Trust Co.
v. Baird, 212 Pa. 41, 61 Atl. 5o7. But cf. the situation where a mortgage is
given for future advances, (931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 647.
'This argument was the basis of the decision in the Superior Court in the
same case. See Fair and Square Bldg. & L. Ass'n. v. Presbyterian Board,
etc., 98 Pa. Super. 409 (1930).
rWimsToN, SE.crIoNs FROM CoNTcrs (1926) 445.
4 The assignee of a mortgage is chargeable with notice of matters of rec-
ord. Hopkins Mfg. Co. v. Ketterer, 237 Pa. 285, 85 AtI. 421 (1912).
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the mortgage alive for future advances' contrary to a well established prin-
ciple of law.8
SALES-CONDITIONAL SALES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES AS SECuRIT" DE-
vices-Vendor replevied chattel which defendant possessed under a contract
of sale made with vendor. The contract provided that vendor should retain
title until completion of payments. It also provided that the vendor have the
right to retake possession and sell, should the purchaser default, and have
the further right to recover the difference should the sale not realize the
contract price. Held (four judges dissenting), that since the purchaser was
in any event to be the debtor of the vendor, the parties, intended the transac-
tion to be a chattel mortgage and consequently the title was in the purchaser
and the vendor could not recover possession, Raymond Bros. Impact Pulverizer
Co. v. Thontas, 294 Pac. 219 (Wash. 193o).
The raison d'etre of the conditional sale and the chattel mortgage alike
is the security they afford the vendor.' In legal incidents the two devices are,
however, different As regards the chattel mortgage the law is settled and
certain; if the debt is not paid the vendor may liquidate the chattel through
foreclosure proceedings
3 As regards the conditional sale the law is confused
by conflicting opinions
4 concerning the rights and remedies of the parties after
a default by the purchaser.
5 By the terms of the conditional sale contract the
seller has two remedies. The one arises out of the title that he holds; the
other is due to the promise of the purchaser to pay. Although there is noth-
ing to indicate that the two are not concurrent, the majority of courts require
the vendor to elect one.
6 If he asserts his title and retakes possession he is not
permitted later to sue for what yet may be owing on the contract, on the ground
The first mortgagee had $2ooo and he had to refund it only if he was
paid in full for his mortgage. His interest in the property was, therefore,
necessarily reduced to the extent of $2o00.
8 The instant case, at 343, seems to indicate an opposite view, "So far as
we are able to discover, no reason exists why an arrangement whereby a mort-
gagor advances funds toward a contemplated assignment is not permissible."
'BOGERT, COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES (1924) ZA UNIFORM
LAws ANNOTATED 1o; Vold, The Divided Property Interests in Conditional
Sales (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 713; Note (1923) 36 HAnv. L. REV. 740.
2 WILLISToN, SALES (2d ed. 1923) § 579.
' BOGERT, op. cit. supra; note I; Magill, The Legal Advantages and Disad-
vantages of the Various Methods of Selling Goods on Credit (1923) 8 CORN. L.
Q. 210.
' BOGERT, op. cit. supra note I ; Void, op. cit. supra note I, 725 et seq.; Note
(1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 740.
'See West Amer. Finance Co. v. Finstad. 146 Wash. 315, 319, 262 Pac.
636, 638 (1928).
'In re Robinson Machine Co., 268 Fed. i65 (E. D. Mich. i92o) ; Frisch v.
Wells, 200 Mass. 429, 86 N. E. 775 (1909) ; WILJsTON, SALEs (2d ed. 1923)
§579a.
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that he has rescinded it.' If, however, he sues on the contract, he is consid-
ered, by the fact of suing, expressly to have admitted the purchaser's title.'
But since a conditional promise is admittedly consideration for a vendee's prom-
ise the contract is valid and should be enforced according to its terms. And
as to the election, it does not logically follow that by asserting one right the
other is relinquished. Based on the difference between the remedies legally
possible to the conditional vendee and the mortgagee the view was advanced
in Michigan' and followed in the instant jurisdiction"0 that the nature of the
transaction should be determined from the remedies agreed to and not from
the terms of the contract. The dissenting argument of the principal case ad-
mitted some justification for the application of the theory between vendor and
bona fide purchaser, since in Washington there is no statute requiring the re-
cording of conditional sales contracts,' but denied the soundness of extending
it to the contracting parties. Where the parties have expressly stipulated that
the vendor should be permitted to retake possession upon the purchaser's de-
fault, refusal to heed such an unequivocal expression of intention is indeed hard
to acquiesce in. It is true that in some situations, where almost the entire pur-
chase price has been paid, the result is justifiable; the aim is to prevent a for-
feiture.' But this means for reaching the result is not to be commended. The
Conditional Sales Act' offers a sensible solution. Its provisions are based on
the fundamental similarity of purpose inherent in the conditional sale and the
chattel mortgage. By requiring recording, strangers are amply protected;"
by providing for foreclosure proceedings, the seller is insured complete sat-
isfaction and the purchaser is protected from a forfeiture.'
'Nashville Lumber Co. v. Robinson, 91 Ark. 319, 121 S. W. 350 (i9o9);
Perkins v. Grobben, 1I6 Mich. 172, 74 N. W. 469 (1898); Star Drilling Co.
v. Richards, .272 Pa. 383, 116 AUt. 309 (1922).
' Smith v. Barber, 153 Ind. 322, 53 N. E. 1014 (1899); Frisch v. Wells,
supra note 6; Eilers Music House v. Douglass, 9o Wash. 683, 156 Pac. 937
(1916). Some courts require a judgment before the election is considered to
have taken place, but this view, although a little less harsh, is open to thl
same objections that apply to the majority view, BumIcK, SALEs (2d ed. i9o1)
19i; Note (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 191.
'Atkinson v. Japink, i86 Mich. 335, 152 N. W. 1079 (1915); this view
is explained and criticized by BoGEar, op. cit. supra note I, 8 8.
0 West Amer. Finance Co. v. Finstad, supra note 5.
' Such acts applying to chattel mortgages are almost universal, ScHouER,
PERSONAL PROPERTY (5th ed. 1918) § 425, whereas those applicable to condi-
tional sales are not, Note (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 6o2, 6o3. The rights of the
conditional vendor, in the absence of a recording act, are generally recognized
as enforcable against bona fide purchasers and vendee creditors alike, Harkness
v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 680, 7 Sup. Ct. 51, 60 (1886).
' Wn.IsToN, SALEs (199o) § 579, at 962, "The only reason for qualifying
this principle (the seller's right to both remedies) is the equitable principle
which forbids a forfeiture."
"This was accepted and offered to the states for adoption in i918. In 1929
it had been adopted in eight states, including New York, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, and in Alaska, UNIFORM CONIrTIONAL SALES AcT, 2 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp. 1929) 2.
"UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT, supra note 13, 8§ 22, 24.
" Ibid. §§ 17-20.
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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX ON PROFITS FROm SALE OF MUNICIPAL
BONDs-Revenue Act of 1924' imposed an income tax on profits from the
sale of property. Plaintiff paid under protest tax on profits derived from the
sale of municipal bonds and sued to recover money paid. Judgment for plain-
tiff was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.! Held, on certiorarmi, that
the imposition of the tax was valid, since it does not appear to affect adversely
nor burden the borrowing power of the state. Willcuts v. Bwm, 5I Sup. Ct. 125
(U. S. 193I).
It is a firmly established principle that state instrumentalities are immune
from federal tax burdens.3 Likewise, federal instrumentalities are exempt from
state taxation; and this, because of the necessity for each of the dual govern-
ments to be free in the proper exercise of governmental functions from tax-
ation by the other. The borrowing power is, of course, within this protection
and hence principal and interest of governmental obligations are exempt from
taxation.' Death duties may be imposed by the federal and state governments
on the transfer of governmental securities of the other'; and this, even though
the transfer be to a state or to the United States.' That estate taxes do not
bear directly upon or adversely affect the exercise of the governmental bor-
rowing power appears decided by the cases. Ordinarily, the commercial in-
ducement to purchase government securities is the exemption of the contract
income from tax. It seems difficult to see how the attractiveness of securities
is lessened any more by a tax on profits derived from resaleI than by im-
position of estate taxes. The court in the instant case properly considered
the economic effect of the tax on the saleability of the securities in determining
whether it imposed any appreciable burden on the borrowing power of the
state. It would seem to follow from the decision that the states, likewise, would
be sustained in taxing the profit derived from the sale of federal securities. 8
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY SIGHT OF LOATHSOME OBJEC-
In response to an order for a loaf of bread defendant's store manager mis-
143 STAT. 253, 267, 268 (Ig4), 26 U. S. C. A. §954 (0928).
235 F. (2d) _9 (C. C. A. 8th, I929). See (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv.
439. 3 Collector v. Day. 78 U. S. 113 (U. S. 187o) ; I CoOLEY, TAXATION § 113
(4th ed. 1924).
'Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673
(i85).
Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829 (igoo); Greiner v.
Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384, 42 Sup. Ct. 324 (1922).
'United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1O73 (1896) (state
tax on bequest to United States) ; Snyder v. Bettman, i9o U. S. 249, 23 Sup.
Ct. 8o3 (19o3) (federal tax on bequest to state).
ILosses from resale may be deducted from taxable income, 43 STAT. 269
(1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §955 (1928).
I This decision seems to indicate that the gain on securities issued at dis-
count would be considered in lieu of interest, and a tax on this would not be
sustained. The gain derived from a sale which represents more than that in
lieu of interest should be taxable as profit. The difficulty in determining what
share of a given gain is interest and what is profit may be a factor leading
to a different result.
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takenly sent plaintiff a package containing a dead rat, the sight of which caused
plaintiff to suffer nausea and subsequent nervous disorders. Held, that the
plaintiff recover. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch., i53 Ati. 22 (Md. 1931).
Courts have departed from the rule that there can be no recovery for the
physical consequences of fright without contemporaneous physical injury' in
two lines of cases: (I) where the defendant's conduct in threatening bodily
harm to the plaintiff or others results in fright and subsequent illness to the
plaintiff;2 (2) where the injury arises from conduct intended to cause mental
disturbance and likely to result in physical suffering The instant case goes
further in that it requires the defendant to take care in doing things which
he should have recognized as involving an unreasonable risk of causing a
nervous reaction likely to result in physical injury There is a modern ten-
dency to treat nausea alone as a sufficient injury to admit parasitic damages for
mental distress and subsequent physical injuries such as miscarriage and nerv-
ous prostration.' If, however, the court in the principal case does not recog-
nize the theory that nausea is in itself a ground of action, the true holding
may be that one who deals with female customers must anticipate the fact
that rather serious bodily harm' is likely to result from the sight of a loath-
some object. Whether this holding is extreme depends upon what propor-
tion of the defendant's customers are prone to suffer somewhat grave illness
from such a stimulus. This question can only be decided by a study of the
social conditions of the community. On the other hand, it is possible that
the court took the view that when an act is likely to cause mental disturbance,
liability should attach whenever it is in fact followed by physical illness as a
natural result, ignoring the fact that there is no duty to avoid emotional dis-
turbance unless there is reason to suppose that it will have physically injurious
consequences.7 Such a holding could have no support in logic since liability
'Kisiel v. Holyoke Ry., 24o Mass. 29, 132 N. E. 622 (i92I) ; Howarth v.
Adams Express Co., 269 Pa. 28o, 112 At. 536 (I92i); see BOHLEN, (1926)
STUDIES IN ToRTS, 288 et seq.; Throckmorton, Dantages for Fright, (i92o)
34 HARv. L. REV. 260, 264 (most American jurisdictions deny recovery for the
consequences of shock without impact).
I Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Cohn v. An-
sonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 794, 148 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1914); Gulf Ry. Co.
v. Coopwood, 96 S. W. io2 (Tex. i9o6); Hambrook v. Stokes [1925] 1 K. B.
145; Note (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 280.
3Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (i9o6) ; Wilkinson v. Down-
ton [18971 2 Q. B. 57; see BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 1928) 64 et seq.
'Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Co., 24o S. W. 588 (Tex. 1922); cf.. Moll-
man v. Union Electric Light Co., 2o6 Mo. App. 253, 227 S. W. 264 (192i) (de-
fendant also a trespasser). For a general discussion of this rule, see (I925)
20 ILL. L. REv. 409; TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § i88.
'Kenney v. Wong Len, 8i N. H. 427, 128 Atl. 324, (1925); cf. Lesch v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 97 Minn. 503, io6 N. W. 955 (i96); Simone v.
Rhode Island Co., 28 R. I. 186, 66 Atl. 2o2 (x9o7).
"The fact that the abnormally severe consequences of the injury in the
instant case could not reasonably have been anticipated would, of course, not
be grounds for denying recovery.
' No action will lie for mental disturbance, which does not result in some
form of physical disability, because of the lack of corroborative evidence of
suffering, Green v. Shoemaker, III Md. 69, 77, 73 Atl. 688, 69o (19o9) ; see
Pound, Inrerests of Personalty, (914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 343, 362.
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would be predicated, not on the defendant's ability to foresee injury, but upon
the mere fact that injury has occurred. Whatever the real theory of the
court may have been, the basis for the decision seems to be a recognition of
the fact that modern conditions and the influx of emotionally unbalanced peo-
ple have made certain acts dangerous which would have been innocuous in a
simple, homogeneous society.
TRovER AND CONVERSION-SALEs-LiABiiTy OF INFANT FOR VIOLAIrON OF
TmuR OF CONDITIONAL. SALE AGR f-NT-Defendant-minor purchased an auto-
mobile on a conditional sale agreement which provided that the car should not
be used in connection with the violation of any state or federal law. Defendant
carried liquors in the car, whereupon it was seized and forfeited to the gov-
ernment. To an action of tort defendant pleaded infancy, alleging that the
action was under the terms of the contract. Held, that the defendant was liable
for the conversion, Vermont Acceptance Corporation v. Wiltshire, 153 At. 199
(Vt 193).
It is fundamental that a bailee who departs from the object of the bailment
and uses the property unauthoritatively is guilty of conversion' by such asser-
tion of dominion over the property and by the denial of the right of the bailor
to ownership. Since a conditional vendee is classed as a bailee of property for
a specific purpose,' it would follow that such persons should be held for an
unauthorized use. The principal case would thus seem to be merely a modem
presentation of the customary "for-hire"r contract with an infant bailee. In
such cases the general rule is that infants are not to be charged for a tort
when the obligation is essentially contractual by merely changing the form
of action from cx contracin to ex delicto; ' but an infant is held accountable
for a tort committed notwithstanding that it may have been connected with
a contract." To determine, in a given case, whether the acts contitute a neg-
ligent performance of th agreement, for which the infant would not be liable,
or an independent and intentional violation of the terms of the contract, con-
stituting a tort for which he would be liable, may be a difficult question. The
mere express introduction into the contract of a provision identical to a com-
'Baxter v. Woodward, 191 Mich. 379, 158 N. W. 137 (1916); Churchill
v. White, 58 Neb. 22, 78 N. W. 369 (i899) ; Raynor v. Sheffler, 79 N. J. .
340, 75 AtI. 748 (igIo).
OEklof v. Waterston, 132 Ore. 479, 285 Pac. 201 (1930); Armington v.
Houston, 38 Vt. 448 (1866). The conditional vendor retains the title until the
conditional vendee performs the terms of the agreement, and title in one and
possession in another is characteristic of bailments.
'Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 44I (1838) ; Collins v. Gifford, 203 N. Y. 465, 96
N. E. 721 (1911); Cowem v. Nield, [1912] 2 K. B. 419; CHAPIN, ToRTs
(917) i59. Contra: Brunhoelzl v. Brandes, go N. J. L. 31 (97) ; Penrose
v. Cullen, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 351 (1832); Spangler Co. v. Haupt, 53 Pa. Sup. 545
(913).
"Churchill v. White, supra note I; Stocks v. Wilson, [1913] _ K. B. 235;
Burnard v. Haggis, 14 C. B. N. S. 45 (1863); CHAPIN, TORTS (1917) I6r.
tEaton v. Hill, 5o N. H. 235 (187o); Young v. Muhling, 48 App. Div.
617, 63 N. Y. Supp. 18I (igoo); Lowery v. Cate, 1o8 Tenn. 54, 64 S. W.
io68 (09oi).
990 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
mon law duty, attached in the absence of express provisions, for which an
action in tort would lie, should not change the nature of the cause of action to
one in contract wherein infancy would be an effective defense. It is to be
noted that the law imposes a limitation that the object of the bailment must
be legal,' and the character of the obligation should not be altered by reason
of the inclusion of the same term into the written agreement of the parties.'
Accordingly, the principal case would seem to reach a sound result in per-
mitting a recovery, and in conformity with what little indication of authority
there is.
WILLs-ADEsPTIoN DURING INSANITY OF TEsTAToR-Testator bequeathed
all his preferred stock in the X corporation to plaintiff. Subsequently, testator
became insane and his lunacy committee sold this stock for his maintenance
even though there were other assets in the estate sufficient for this purpose.
At death of testator plaintiff brought suit for the proceeds realized from the
sale of the stock and the executor contended that the legacy had been adeemed.
Held (one judge dissenting), that there was no ademption. In re Ireland's
Will, 247 N. Y. Supp. 267 (i93i).
Ademption is the term used to describe that state of facts the legal conse-
quence of which is that a specific legatee named in a will does not receive the
designated bequest. The majority of courts hold that the existence in specie
of the thing given is the determining factor of an ademption, on the ground
that if the res of the legacy is not in the estate at the time of the death of the
decedent, there is nothing answering that description and consequently nothing
upon which the will can operate.' The minority of courts, however, have fol-
lowed the former English rule,' that, in order to have an ademption, the non-
existence of the thing bequeathed must be due to a manifestation of intention
by the testator that the specific legatee shall receive nothing.' The theory upon
which this minority view proceeds is that, since the intention of the testator
governs in the construction of a will, a legacy will not be construed as adeemed
'This is termed legality of object; see Smith v. Rollins, ii R. I. 464 (1876).
This was the precise situation in the principal case.
'The seller has usually chosen replevin as his remedy in this situation.
Dorothy v. Salzberg, 2o7 Ill. App. 133 (917) ; Robinson v. Berry, 93 Me. 320,
45 Atl. 34 (899). But see Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend. 137, 144 (N. Y. 1828),
"If he should sell the horse, an action of trover would lie against him for the
tort"; cf. Queen v. McDonald, 15 Q. B. D. 323 (1885) (larceny by bailee
where infant removed goods contrary to bailment term).
'For general discussion see 3 WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMIN-
ISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) 446.
' Ametrano v. Downs, 17o N. Y. 388, 63 N. E. 340 (1902) ; Beck v. Mc-
Gillis, 9 Barb. 35 (N. Y. 185o) ; Pattison v. Pattison, I Myl. & K. 12 (1832);
Pleasants' Appeal, 77 Pa. 356 (1875); Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox C. C. 18o
(1789).
2 Partridge v. Paltridge, Cas. t. Talbot 226 (1736).
'Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 7th, I9io); Beall v.
Blake, i6 Ga. iig (1854); Lamkin v. Kaiser, 256 S. W. 558 (Mo. App. 1923);
Morse v. Converse, 8o N. H. 24, 113 Atl. 214 (1921) ; In re Cooper, 95 N. J.
Eq. 210, 123 Atl. 45 (1923).
RECENT CASES
unless it appears from the will that the testator intended an ademption. Though
this is in accordance with the policy of courts to carry out the intention of
decedents, yet, the difficulty of determining that intention has led to the adop-
tion of the absolute rule of law by the majority of courts0 Manifestly then,
if New York following the majority purports to consider not the reason for
the change of the res, but rather the fact of change itself,' the conclusion is
irresistible that an ademption has occurred in the principal case. However
this court and others, purporting to adopt the majority view, realize that an
inexorable application of that rule to a factual situation similar to that of the
present case would lead to a most undesirable conclusion. As a result a most
illogical, but highly commendable, exception has been engrafted upon the ma-
jority rule in the case of insanity.8
Partridge v. Partridge, m.pra note 3.
Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212 (1851). In Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2
Cox. C. C. 184 (789) Lord Thurblow says "the idea of discussing what might
be the particular motives and intentions of the testator, in each case in de-
stroying the subject of the bequest, would be productive of endless uncertainty
and confusion."
'Matter of Brann, 219 N. Y. 263, 114 N. E. 404 (I916); Ametrano v.
Downs, sumpra ncAe 4; Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. 258 (N. Y. 1823).
'Matter of Carter, 71 Misc. 4o6, i3o N. Y. Supp. 2oi (19i) ; Macfar-
lane v. Macfarline, 47 Scot. L. R. 266 (igio) (the intention test is rejected and
yet it is held that in order for an ademption to occur the act of the conservator
must have been one that was absolutely necessary for support of the lunatic
and further be such an act as would have been done by the lunatic were he
sui gcneris); cf. cases cited, supra note 6. Cwtra: Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa.
301 (1853).
